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Recent Changes In Ontario Adoption Legislation
GARY J. SMITH and ALFRED W. J. DICK *

In the last few years, Ontario's adoption legislation has undergone an amazing transformation. It is perhaps significant that the
law on this matter is no longer to be found in The "Adoption" Act
but rather in The "Child Welfare" Act. Concern for the welfare
of the adopted child has been the keynote of these gratifying changes,
and marks the whole-hearted acceptance of adoption as a desirable
social policy in Ontario.1
The concept of adoption is not a new one. It was used commonly by the Greeks and Romans to effect succession, and, in later
times, was employed in France to deal with orphans of dead soldiers.
In England, there was really no legal adoption at common law. De
facto adoptions, possibly under adoption agreements, existed, but
could have no effect on status, since the rights of parents were
regarded as inalienable at common law.2 Generally speaking this
,was the position in Ontario prior to the enactment of our first Adoption Act in 1921. Hence, legal adoption is wholly statutory in Ontario.
In this article no attempt will be made to describe in detail the
statutory provisions and the adoption procedure, but the changes
effected by the 1958 legislation will be indicated. Under the new
legislation the steps necessary to effect a legal adoption are in
broad outline the same as before, namely-the prospective adoptive
parent must possess certain qualifications and must have obtained
certain consents before an adoption order will be made by the court.
Whereas formerly the legislation allowed the application to be
heard in chambers, the new provision requires that an application
for an adoption order shall be heard and determined in chambers.3
The use of the imperative "shall" in place of the permissive "may"
in all probability effects no change in the actual procedure formerly
employed, but is one of several examples of statutory recognition
of the emphasis being placed upon the welfare of the child; it is
assumed without discussion that the interests of the child are better
served by the more private and informal hearing afforded to a
chambers application.
Messrs. Smith and Dick are in the third year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
I Classified newspaper advertisements are a good example of this acceptance.2
Graveson and Crane, A Century of Family Law (1857-1957) (London,
Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 1957), at pp. 4546.
3The Child Welfare Amendment Act, 1958 (Ont.), c. 11, s. 61(2).
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There has been an effort on the part of the legislature to clear
up any obscurity which arose in the interpretation of the 1954 Act.
The ambiguity of the former section 69 is removed by the use of
"spouse" instead of the awkward phrase, "the wife or husband as
the case may be"; the latter could be said not to relate to the husband
or wife making the application. The type of consent required in this
and other sections is now expressly stated to be "written".
Similarly, section 64 is much more satisfactory than section 70
which it replaces. Particular provision is made for the consents
required where a child is born in wedlock and where it is born out
of wedlock, whereas the former section gave a general rule for infants
under twenty-one followed by a "notwithstanding" subsection in
which an exception was made in the case of illegitimate children.
Further, in the case of children born out of wedlock provision is
made for the cancellation of that consent by the mother or father
by a document in writing to that effect made within twenty-one days
after consent is given and verified by an affidavit of execution.
This raises the question of the right to cancel a consent once
given. This is a problem that in recent years has resulted in much
litigation and has caused distress to the parties involved. At common law, parental rights were considered to be inalienable, and until
1958 the relevant legislation contained no provisions which could be
said to have changed the law in this regard. Thus in Re Baby Duffell,4 the Supreme Court of Canada respected the wishes of the
mother of an illegitimate child by allowing her to withdraw a consent to adoption given by her in writing and requiring that the child
be returned to her. Cartwright J. stated that as the law then stood
the wishes of the mother must be given effect to unless very serious
and important reasons require that, having regard to the child's welfare, they must be disregarded.5 It is submitted that the court paid
lip service only to any consideration of the welfare of the child in
disregarding the fact that the child had been in the custody of the
adoptive parents from shortly after birth until the determination
of this appeal over two years later. This case was followed in the
Supreme Court of Canada in Hepton v. Maat6 and in Re Agar.7
The words of Rand J. in the former case illustrate the reluctance
the courts had to interfere with parental rights. In agreeing with
the view that prima facie the natural parents are entitled to custody,
he concluded:
The controlling fact in the type of case we have here is that the welfare
of the child can never be determined as an isolated fact, that is, as if
the child were free from natural parental bonds entailing moral responsibility-as
if, for example, he were a homeless orphan wandering at
8

large.
4

[1950] S.C.R. 737.

5Tid. p. 746.
6 [1957]
7 [1958]

S.C.R. 606.
S.C.R. 52, 55.
8
Supra, footnote 6 at p. 607.
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Section 64(6) provides that the consent can be withdrawn only
if, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the court is
satisfied that it is in the best interests of the child that the consent
be withdrawn. This effects a statutory reversal of the matters which
are to be the basis of the court's decision. The welfare of the child
is now the primary consideration. Although it is unlikely that this
welfare can ever be entirely isolated from the "moral bonds" existing between the child and his natural parent, the policy of the
legislation is clear. The near-absolute power of the parent to revoke
consent has been replaced by the requirement that a parent wishing
to withdraw his consent must satisfy the court of a positive situation,
i.e., that the welfare of the child is being served by such withdrawal.
In keeping with this approach, the 1958 Act has clarified the circumstances in which a consent can be dispensed with by the court. In
section 72(2) of the 1954 legislation we find a vague reference to circumstances in which the consent may "properly" be dispensed with
by the court. It is not surprising, in retrospect, that section 64(5)
which replaces the old sec.72(2) defines the circumstances in which
it is proper to dispense with the consents required under section 64
in the now familiar phrase "if the court is satisfied that it is in the
best interests of the child."
It is curious to note that the court may now dispense with the
consent of a children's aid society, but not with the consent of the
spouse of the person making application for adoption.9 Under the
10
1954 legislation, if the court was of the opinion that it was "proper",
it could dispense with any consent but that required of a children's
aid society by section 70(3). In effect, the new legislation acknowledges that the interest of the child cannot be served by an adoption to
which the spouse of the adopting parent does not consent. Further,
it denies to the children's aid society the right to prevent an adoption
by refusing consent where the court considers it in the best interests
of the child that it dispense with such consent. It must be noted
that although the discussion of withdrawal of consent has been
limited to consents given by parents, section 64(6) likewise refers to
all consents required by section 64. It would, perhaps, have been
better if this subsection had referred to consents required by this
part instead of section, as no provision is made for the withdrawal
of consent given by the spouse of the adopting parent. It is unnecessary, however, to speculate as to whether any such right was intended to be given. This matter, if it arose, would be adequately
covered by section 67(b) which requires the court to be satisfied,
before an adoption order is made, that it is in the best interests of the
child. Clearly, except in special circumstances similar to those required by section 63 (1), the desire of the spouse to withdraw consent
would militate against the making of an adoption order and would
result in a revocation of consent quite as effective as if the consent
were withdrawn under section 64 (6).
9

The Child Welfare Amendment Act, 1958 (Ont.), c. 11, s. 64(5).

10 The Child Welfare Amendment Act, 1954 (Ont.), c. 8, s. 72(2).
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The legislature has not entirely disregarded the position of the
natural parents. There is still reserved to the mother, and to the
father if the child resides with and is maintained by the father, the
absolute right to cancel such consent within twenty-one days after
it was given.11 Also, the same section requires that the consent of
the mother of an illegitimate child must be given after the child is
seven days old. This is intended to allow her time to consider her
decision. Too often cases have arisen in which unscrupulous and
even well-meaning persons had prevailed upon the unfortunate
mother to give a consent which she claimed to withdraw on further
consideration. It is questionable whether seven days is an adequate
allowance; however, the position of the adopting parents also requires
consideration.
Before leaving the matter of consent, a comment should be
made upon the unfavourable effects that the publicity, which has been
given cases where consent has been revoked, has had upon prospective adoptive parents. Some effort should be made to publicize the
remedial steps taken by the legislature to make the position of the
adoptive parent more secure. In order to ensure the effectiveness
of Ontario's adoption programme, it is not enough to wait until an
application is made to explain the legal implications of an adoption
order.
Reference has already been made to section 67 which reproduces
in shorter form the conditions precedent to the making of an adoption order which were set out in section 75 of the 1954 Act. The
new section omits, however, subsection (3) which required that
the court be satisfied that no reward was involved in the making of
the adoption. The legislature was quite justified in making this
change as the matter of payments for procuring adoptions is adequately covered by the penal section.12 It is also in keeping with
the general view of the new act that the welfare of the child is the
paramount consideration. Thus, an adoption order now might issue
as being in the best interests of the child in the particular circumstances although some reward was involved.
The most striking and far-reaching in their effect have been
the changes brought about by section 74. An English periodical has
expressed the view that "adoption is a fiction played by adults,
who pretend that a child, generally not theirs, is theirs."' 3 Such a
statement assumes that prima facie adopted children are not the
children of the adoptive parents because they were not born to the
adoptive parents, but the legislature has reversed this premise, so
that the adults no longer have to "pretend". For years it has been
a social fact that a child adopted into a home is a child of that
11The Child Welfare Amendment Act, 1958 (Ont.), c. 11, s.64(2). This
subsection is subject to s. 64(5) which allows the court to dispense with
consents required by s. 64.
32 Ibid. s. 78.
13 (1957), 223 L.T. at p. 284.
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family so far as the child and parents were concerned. Indeed,
sociologists and other persons active in child welfare speak of furnishing a child with the tender loving care and security which can
be provided best in a healthy family environment, and they look
on a proper adoption as providing an unwanted child with a better
opportunity to mature happily. In Ontario, the legal effect of adoption did not match the social effect until the passage of the 1958
legislation, which instituted a simple all-embracing approach to the
position of an adopted child, and kept in sight the welfare of the
child as the paramount criterion.
This approach was well-summarized by Chief Justice McRuer
in the important case of Re BlackweW1- 4 where his Lordship said:
This Act did not purport to declare rights but created a legal relationship from which legal rights and legal responsibilities flowed and likewise it destroyed the legal relationship arising out of the natural birth
of the child.
Prior to this statement, Chief Justice McRuer set out an exhaustive
account of the previous legislation and case law in several common
law jurisdictions. In general, the trend of the legislation was to
cause the adopted child either to be deemed in law the child born
in lawful wedlock of the adopting parent except in certain circumstances, 15 or to be accorded the same rights, upon the intestacy of
his adopting parent, in the property of that parent as a child born
in lawful wedlock.16 In short, the adopted child either was deemed,
with express reservations, to be a legitimate child or was considered
to have a separate status and to possess only certain itemized rights
similar to those held by legitimate children. In Ontario such an
enumeration of rights and obligations has been abolished. Subsections (1), (2), and (3) of section 74 confer on the adopted child the
status of a legitimate offspring of the adopting parent. The sole
exception to these "blanket" provisions is section 74(4), which deals
with the laws relating to incest and to consanguinity in marriage.
A recent English case, Re MarshaZ,17 may be contrasted with Re
Blackwell. An important point in Re Marshall was that the date of
distribution of the testator's estate in relation to the adopted child
fell before the passing of the 1957 British Columbia legislation, and
the court applied the law in force at the time of the testator's death.
This law of 1945, both in British Columbia and England, did not give
the adopted child the succession rights of a legitimate child, and
the court further held that prima facie adopted children were not
within the class of "child" as intended by the testator. In other
words, by the law in force at the time of the death of the deceased,
the testator, in using the word "child", was prima facie taken to
that adopted children
refer only to a child born in lawful wedlock, so
18
were excluded along with illegitimate children.
14 [19591 O.R. 377 at p. 401.
15 1895 (N.Z.) c. 8, s. 7.
16 Adoption Act, R.S.O. 1927, c. 53, s. 6(2).

17 [1957] 1 Ch. 507 (C.A.).
18 Ibid. at p. 523.
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In Re Blackwell, Chief Justice McRuer in refusing to accept a
submission that the intention of the testator was similarly to be
construed, indicated that the words "for all purposes" in section 74
fully covered all situations.1 9 In this case, the point of distribution
fell after January 1, 1959, with the result that the 1958 legislation
applied so as to give the adopted child a legal "rebirth" as of
January 1, 1959.20 Once a case falls to be decided under the new
enactment, the "rebirth" becomes retroactive from the operation of
the word "heretofore" in section 75 and eliminates any discussion
regarding the intention of the testator. Thus sections 74 (1) and 74 (2)
form all-embracing clauses which transform an adopted child into
the legal child of his adoptive parents, and section 74(3) seeks to
clarify this even further by indicating that 74(1) and (2) shall
determine the relationship among all persons other than the parent
and child.
Some interesting points on this aspect of the 1958 legislation
deserve short comment. An adopted child's former dual capacity,
whereby he was essentially still the child of his natural parents while
being the child of the adopters for certain purposes, no longer exists.
He loses, for example, all right to the property of his natural parents,
by way of intestate succession. Compensation for this loss is the
achievement of complete legal membership in his new family. This
is desirable as his new "single" position eliminates confusion and
tends to stabilize the child emotionally since he will not be torn
between two sets of parents as much as he was under the old legislation.
It is well-established that a legitimate child receives his domicile
of origin from his father, and an illegitimate child receives his domicile of origin from his mother.21 However, if a child experiences a
"legal rebirth" and becomes the legal child of his adoptive parents,
it is submitted that he now takes his domicile of origin from his
adoptive parents.2 2 This result is in line with the intention of the
legislation in cutting off all relationship with the natural parents,
and is covered in the words "for all purposes". 23
It is to be noted that the Ontario legislation makes no mention
of other Acts in Ontario which distinguish between persons related
by adoption and persons who are not. In the 1956 legislation of
British Columbia, 24 subsections (1), (2), (3), and (4) of section 9
are very similar in wording and effect to the corresponding subsections of section 74 of the Ontario legislation, but subsection (5) states:
This section is to be read subject to the provisions of any Act which
distinguishes in any way between persons related by adoption and persons not so related.
19 [19591 O.R. 377 at p. 403.

20 Ibid. at p. 404.
21 Udny v. Udny (1869), L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 441.
22
See Article 4(1) (iii) of the Code of the Law of Domicile-First Report
of the Private International Law Committtee, Cmd. 9068, App. A.
23The Child Welfare Amendment Act, 1958 (Ont.), c. 11, s. 74.
241956 (B.C.) c. 2, consolidated in 1957 (B.C.), c. 1.
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An example of where this might arise in Ontario is found in
section 158(2) of the Insurance Act,25 which provides that "adopted
children", "children of adopted children", and "grandchildren" are included as preferred beneficiaries. Mr. G. D. Kennedy points out that
this apparently excludes adopted children of children and adopted
children of adopted children.2 6 The fact that the British Columbia
legislature felt it necessary to include such an express exception is an
indication that if such an exception were absent, the new law regarding adopted children would override and alter the provisions of other
Acts. Further, since the Ontario legislation emphasizes that, "for
all purposes.. ." an adopted child is legitimate, and that the relationship to one another of all persons "be determined by this consideration", 27 it would seem that the words of the Insurance Act are
rendered redundant and that the previously excluded persons would
now come in as "grandchildren". A problem of statutory interpretation arises on this point since either the Insurance Act or the Child
Welfare Act might be characterized as a particular enactment and
so take precedence. 28 It is submitted, however, in view of the ambiguity, that the Child
Welfare Act should override the Insurance Act
29
on this question.
Of interest is the ingenious use made recently of legislation
which has provisions regarding the status of an adopted child similar
to those in the Ontario legislation. In Be X,3o a case tried before the
British Columbia Supreme Court in 1957, an unmarried mother
sought to adopt her illegitimate child. The British Columbia Adoption Act 31 contains the following provision:
4 (1) Any adult unmarried person, or any adult husband and his adult
wife together, may apply to adopt a child under the provisions of
this Act.
(2) In like manner, an adult husband and his wife together may apply
to adopt the child of either of them, whether legitimate or Illegitimate.
(3) An adult husband or an adult wife may individually apply to adopt
the child of either of them.

Strictly, the applicant was not an adult "wife", but Clyne J. felt
that he should interpret the Act liberally and permit the adoption

of the child in order to follow the intention of the Act which was
to provide for the welfare of the child. However, the learned judge
was disquieted by the potential danger to the institution of marriage
if the adoption legislation were used often as a method of legitima25 R.S.O., 1950, c. 183.
26 (1957-58), 12 U. of T. L.J. 296 at p. 298.

27

74(3).
28

The Child Welfare Amendment Act, 1958 (Ont.), c. 11, ss. 74(1) and
Halsbury's Laws of England, Second edition, Vol. 31 at p. 484, No.

604: ".

.

. Where two co-ordinate sections are apparently inconsistent, an

effort must be made to reconcile them. If this is impossible, the latter will
generally override the earlier; but a particular enactment, wherever found,
must be construed strictly as against a general provision."
29 Ibid.
30 (1958), 12 D.L.R. (2d) 367 (B.C.).
311957 (B.C.) c. 1.
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tion. No similar section exists in Ontario, but section 63(1) (c)
should cover the situation since by this section the presumption
would be firmly against an adoption by an unmarried applicant.
However, if such a situation were allowed in Ontario, an interesting
32
problem could arise. Section 1 of The Legitimation Act provides
other after
each
marry
child
that if the parents of an illegitimate
his birth, the child will be deemed legitimate from the date of birth,
but section 2 qualifies this by saying that if either of the parents
was married at the time of birth, and legitimation subsequently
takes places, the child may not compete with the lawful children
by the first marriage of that parent. However, where A is married
to B and causes an illegitimate child D to be born to C, C might
adopt D with the result that D becomes C's lawful child. When A
marries C, it is submitted that the words "for all purposes" in section 74(1) and the words of section 74(3)33 could cause C's lawful
child to become A's lawful child apart from the operation of the
Legitimation Act. 34 Further, it is submitted that this situation would
enable D to compete on A's intestacy with the lawful children of A's
first marriage, contrary to the express words of section 2 of the
Legitimation Act. Although the courts would undoubtedly prevent
any abuses which would tend to impair the institution of marriage,
an amendment to remove any ambiguity in section 63 could eliminate
the possibility of difficulties arising, at least with respect to future
Ontario adoptions.
Section 75, to which reference has already been made in discussing the Blackwell decision, is an improvement over the former
section 78 which it replaces, as it is wider in scope and includes in its
operation an adoption made in any country, instead of merely an
adoption made in another province of Canada. Despite the section's
apparent clarity, it raises a question of great importance in deciding
what persons, in the wording of the section, "shall be governed by
this Part". More precisely, Ontario's built-in conflict rule section
does not settle the problem of foreign adoptions which are not effected by an adoption "order". It is possible for a person to be legally
adopted under the laws of some other jurisdiction and yet not have
the benefits of the subsections of section 74. These subsections
depend upon an adoption order being made for their operation. What
should be the status in Ontario of a person who is legally adopted
in the eyes of a foreign law under an adoption agreement entered
into according to the law of that jurisdiction? There may be no
machinery, moreover, for obtaining a court order in that country.
The position in Ontario where a de facto adoption had been effected
before the advent of the legislation providing for the legal formali32 R.S.O., 1950, c. 203, s. 1.
33 The Child Welfare Amendment Act, 1958 (Ont.), c. 11.
34 This would definitely seem to be the position where such an adoption
and the subsequent remarriage occurred prior to January 1, 1959. See Be
BlWkwell, p. 402.
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ties is obscure,35 but the better view is that the benefits of this part
would not be attracted by such a relationship. It is questionable
whether such a strict view should prevail when an Ontario court
is considering a foreign adoption. Reference to the adoption order
being made should be equated with the simple requirement that
there be a legal adoption in the eyes of the foreign law and not with
the necessity of a particular procedure. It is submitted that an
amendment similar to the New Zealand legislation of 1955 would be
in order. There provision is made for recognition of adoptions for
the purpose of attaching the incidents of a child born in lawful
wedlock, if they are legally valid according to the law of the place
where made, if the effect of the adoption was to give the adoptive
parent rights over the child superior to those of the natural parent,
and, further, if the adoptive parent had rights equal to or superior
to those of the natural parent on the intestacy of the child. In
addition, specific provision is made for certain preferred adoption
jurisdictions to whose adoptions the provisions are specifically said
to be applicable. 36
While on the matter of conflicts and jurisdiction, it should be
pointed out that section 62 provides that the court may make an
order for the adoption of any child resident in Ontario upon application being made in the prescribed manner by any person
domiciled in Canada and resident in Ontario. 37 The interesting point
here is that we find one of the few legislative references to a
"Canadian" domicile. We would suggest that the insertion of the
word "anywhere", making the particular words of the section read
"by any person domiciled anywhere in Canada", would avoid the
rather theoretical question of whether there is a distinct Canadian
domicile. Such an amendment would necessitate proof by the applicant of the acquisition of a domicile in a particular province or
territory of Canada. Thus the applicant would not be able to rely
upon a general intention to establish his domicile somewhere in
Canada; the animus and factum necessary for the acquisition of a
domicile of choice would not only have to concur in time, but also
have to refer to the same territorial division.
In any review of legislation it is usually considered to be the
prerogative of the reviewer to find faults and generally to criticize
the act of Parliament. This, however, is not an occasion for the
exercise of that prerogative. Aside from the rather technical criticisms we have already voiced, it can be said that the legislature, to
35

1n Re McCleneghan Estate, [1954] O.W.N. 148; Jackson v. Jackson,

[1942] O.W.N. 145; Re Miller, [1955] 3 D.L.R. 404 (Ont.).
36 Adoption
37

Act, 1955 (N.Z.), c. 93, s. 17.

Prior to 1954, jurisdiction depended upon the applicant's being domiciled in Ontario: R.S.O., 1950, c. 7, s. 2.
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use the words of Stephen J. has attained "a degree of precision
which a person reading in bad faith cannot misunderstand". 38 This
should not be construed as a bouquet to the pioneering spirit of the
Ontario legislature, but rather as a commendation of its willingness
to follow whole-heartedly the good example of other legislatures,
notably those of New Zealand and British Columbia.3 9 It should also
be noted that no small part of the credit for these advances on the
Canadian scene is due to the efforts of ir. Gilbert Kennedy whose
proposals 4o have been incorporated in the present legislation.

38 In re Castioni, [18911 1 Q.B. 149 at p. 167.
3

9 Re Backwell at p. 402.
e.g., The Legal Effects of Adoption (1955), 33 Can. Bar Rev. at p. 751;
Adoption in the Conflict of Laws (1956), 34 Can. Bar Rev. at p. 507.
40

